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Bahrain’s Aborted Revolution   
Kristian Coates Ulrichsen 
The uprising in Bahrain that began on February 14, 2011 has been contained but not resolved. While the immediate danger to the position of the ruling Al-Khalifa family has passed, the 
demands of the protestors have hardened with the failure of the regime to offer meaningful 
concessions to political reform. Caught in the crosshairs of regional and international geopolitics, 
the aborted Bahraini revolution and the crushing of the pro-democracy movement holds significant 
lessons for the prospects for peaceful political reform in any of the other Gulf monarchies 
predicated on a genuine sharing of power and control. ver the last decade, many scholars and 
analysts have tried to assess India’s emergence as a major actor in the global arena by looking 
at such material indicators as economic growth, military expansion or demographic evolution. 
REVOLUTION AT THE PEARL ROUNDABOUT
Bahrain has a long history of popular opposition to the Al-Khalifa dynasty rooted in policies of unequal 
and selective development. Periodic outbreaks of major social unrest have alternated with periods of 
détente in cycles dating back to the 1920s. The 2000s witnessed a continuation of this cyclical process 
as King Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa unveiled constitutional reforms that promised much but ultimately 
delivered little of substance. In 2001, the draconian 1974 State Security Law that had provided cover for 
the suppression of political opposition and massive human rights violations was scrapped. Constitutional 
changes were laid out in a National Action Charter that was approved by an overwhelming 98 percent 
of Bahrainis in a referendum on February 14, 2001, paving the way for the return of an elected assembly 
in 2002, 27 years after its suspension in 1975.
However, the promise of a unicameral elected legislature was immediately diluted by the addition of 
an upper house of royal appointees. Low confidence in the sincerity of the political opening led to 
a range of political societies, spanning the ideological and religious spectrum, boycotting the 2002 
election. Although most societies participated in the 2006 and 2010 elections, the former was marred 
by allegations of systematic fraud and gerrymandering, while the latter followed a heavy-handed 
clampdown on opposition and human rights activists. Widespread accounts of arbitrary detention 
and allegations of torture signified a return to the repressive ways of the regime’s past. Meanwhile, 
socio-economic discontent was bubbling up, propelled by high levels of unemployment, the inability of 
economic diversification to generate sufficient jobs or economic opportunities for Bahraini youth, and 
popular anger at perceived corruption at the heart of government.
It was in this context of rising tension that Bahraini organisers planned a day of protest on February 
14, 2011. The date was symbolic, as it marked the tenth anniversary of the referendum that approved 
the National Action Charter. It also followed in the wake of the popular uprisings that swept away 
the Ben Ali and Mubarak regimes in Tunisia and Egypt. The inspirational sight of largely non-violent 
demonstrations defying political suppression and refusing to submit to the security regimes that had kept 
authoritarian leaders in power for decades was transformative. Emboldened protestors voiced demands 
ahead of the February 14 day of protest for greater political freedom and equality for all Bahrainis. 
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These targeted the regime’s policies of fomenting 
sectarian division to inhibit the emergence of any 
popular cross-community opposition movement.
Although initially small in scale and predominantly 
confined to Shia villages outside Manama, the 
demonstrations gathered momentum after Bahraini 
police killed two protestors. They also migrated to 
the heart of the capital’s Pearl Roundabout, close to 
the flagship Bahrain Financial Harbour. Ominously 
for the regime, the demonstrations quickly assumed 
popular overtones as Sunnis and Shias alike gathered 
in unprecedented numbers and chanted slogans such 
as ‘No Shias, no Sunnis, only Bahrainis.’ By the evening 
of February 16, tens of thousands of overwhelmingly 
young Bahrainis were camped in Pearl Roundabout 
and shouting ‘Down, down Khalifa!’ This dramatic 
escalation directly threatened the domestic legitimacy 
of the Al-Khalifa, and panicked the regime into a 
brutal response as forces stormed the roundabout in 
the middle of the night and opened fire on sleeping 
demonstrators.
As the protests moved into a new post-clampdown 
phase, the regime reacted by sponsoring counter-
demonstrations to try to fracture the social movement 
confronting them. Thousands of pro-government 
supporters gathered at the Al-Fateh Mosque in Juffair 
on February 21 to declare their support for the regime. 
Notably, they included large numbers of non-Bahraini 
expatriate workers and naturalised citizens whose 
livelihoods depended upon regime goodwill. In 
response, an estimated 200,000 people (one in six 
of all Bahraini citizens) participated in a pro-democracy 
march to the Pearl Roundabout on February 25, as 
two massive columns of protestors converged on the 
roundabout to demand the resignation of the Prime 
Minister, Khalifa bin Salman Al-Khalifa.
With the position of the ruling family clearly 
jeopardised, negotiations between the regime’s 
leading modernising force, Crown Prince Salman bin 
Hamad Al-Khalifa, and the largest opposition political 
society, Al-Wefaq, commenced in March. Despite 
coming close to an agreement based around a set of 
agreed political reforms, the talks broke down, and on 
March 14 the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) sent 
in its Peninsula Shield Force to help restore stability 
in Bahrain. In reality, this consisted of 1000 men of 
the Saudi Arabian National Guard and a contingent 
of military police from the United Arab Emirates. They 
provided the essential backbone while the Bahrain 
Defence Force pursued and arrested thousands of 
people across the country. 
A state of national emergency was declared 
the following day, which lasted until June 1, and 
there followed a brutal crackdown as the Bahraini 
government mercilessly pursued all forms of dissent; 
detaining doctors and lawyers merely for treating or 
representing detainees, suspending opposition political 
societies and arresting their leaders, and detaining a 
founder of Bahrain’s major independent newspaper 
Al-Wasat, who subsequently died in custody. Hundreds 
of mostly Shia workers were dismissed from public and 
private sector positions for ‘absenteeism’ during the 
demonstrations. Widespread tactics of intimidation 
also included the destruction of Shia shrines and 
posters showing prominent Shia leaders with nooses 
around their necks.
Simultaneously, the Bahrain National Guard embarked 
on a hasty recruitment drive in Pakistan to augment 
its limited manpower with non-Bahraini personnel 
who had fewer qualms about opening fire on civilian 
protesters. Meanwhile, the bulldozing of the Pearl 
Roundabout, with its iconic monument to Gulf unity, 
represented a crude attempt to destroy the symbolic 
heart of the protest movement. With this act, the 
authorities hoped to prevent it from becoming an 
anti-regime equivalent of Cairo’s Tahrir Square, but it 
noticeably failed to quell the sense of defiance among 
marginalised communities.
THE POLITICAL INQUEST
Following the lifting of martial law in June 2011, 
King Hamad convened a National Dialogue and 
created an ostensibly independent investigation 
into the springtime unrest. Through these initiatives, 
the government hoped to begin a process of 
reconciliation with the opposition. However, their 
flawed implementation widened the chasm between 
the Al-Khalifa and their opponents by casting serious 
doubt on the credibility of the regime’s commitment 
to reform. 
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Bahrain’s National Dialogue convened on July 2 and ran 
until July 30, 2011. It began under a cloud, following 
the June 22 decision of the National Safety Court to 
sentence 13 prominent opposition figures to varying 
terms of imprisonment. The majority were committed 
to non-violent protest and many had participated in 
the political opening that followed the ending of 
the previous bout of internal unrest in 1999. Their 
imprisonment illustrated the gloved-fist nature of the 
regime’s approach, jailing some of its opponents while 
simultaneously reaching out to others. 
The National Dialogue suffered a credibility gap from 
the beginning. Despite winning up to 45 percent of the 
vote in the October 2010 parliamentary election, the 
major opposition group Al-Wefaq was only granted 
five out of 300 delegates. This was consistent with the 
overall composition of the dialogue, in which delegates 
representing all Bahraini opposition societies only 
constituted 11.67 percent of the total. The remaining 
participants overwhelmingly favoured keeping the 
regime in its current shape. Core opposition demands 
including redrawing electoral boundaries for greater 
proportional representation and creating an elected 
government were not on the agenda; nor was any 
discussion permitted of the nature or extent of the 
ruling family’s power.
Al-Wefaq withdrew from the National Dialogue halfway 
through, with its own judgement to participate being 
called into question by critics. The Dialogue continued, 
and concluded with a series of recommendations, 
including one that the Prime Minister (rather than 
the King) would appoint the government. As the 
long-serving Prime Minister (in office since 1971) 
represented one of the key obstacles to reform, this 
hardly constituted a political concession. Nor did the 
Dialogue come to an agreement over the electoral 
boundaries, another major opposition grievance. Far 
from drawing a line under the unrest, the flawed 
process reinforced existing divisions and demonstrated 
very clearly that critical issues of political contention 
were simply not up for debate. 
The National Dialogue partially overlapped with the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI). This 
was established by King Hamad on June 29 to ‘inquire 
into the incidents’ in February and March and their 
consequences. Its chair was Egyptian Professor Cherif 
Bassiouni, who led the UN Security Council commission 
that investigated war crimes in the former Yugoslavia 
in the 1990s. Similar to the National Dialogue, the 
Commission quickly ran into difficulty, as a series of 
interviews given by Bassiouni appeared to prejudge its 
outcome and exonerate officials of any responsibility 
for human rights violations. His comments drew a 
furious reaction from Bahraini human rights groups 
and opposition figures, who pointed to statements 
made by members of the Al-Khalifa praising and (in 
some cases) inciting the security forces.
Doubtless chastened by the hostility to his remarks, 
Bassiouni surprised almost everyone with the hard-
hitting content of his report when it was published 
on November 23. In a televised speech in front of the 
King, Bassiouni stated that the authorities had used 
torture and excessive force during its crackdown on 
protestors. He pinpointed a culture of unaccountability 
among the security services operating during the 
state of emergency, and accused unnamed officials 
of disobeying laws designed to safeguard human 
rights. Most notably of all, he argued that many of 
the protests did not fall outside of the participatory 
rights of citizens, and that he had not found evidence 
of any link to Iranian involvement, contradicting 
regime narratives that ascribed the protests to external 
intervention rather than domestic grievances.
BETWEEN REFORM AND REPRESSION
In response, the King pledged to initiate reforms, 
and established a National Commission to oversee 
their implementation. Yet the measures taken to 
date have left many of the roots of Bahrain’s political 
and economic inequalities unaddressed, and ongoing 
clashes between protesters and security forces have 
continued unabated, with more than ten protestors’ 
deaths since November. The result has been the 
empowerment of radical voices across the political 
spectrum and the marginalisation of Bahrain’s political 
middle ground. The emergence of radicalised splinter 
groups means that it is no longer possible to speak 
of a ‘regime-opposition’ dichotomy. Elements of the 
opposition are growing more violent, and calls have 
intensified from extremist groups urging the regime 
to crush the opposition once and for all. 
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Measures that have been taken since November 
include revoking the arrest powers of the National 
Security Apparatus after the Bassiouni report detailed 
its ‘systematic practice of physical and psychological 
mistreatment, which in many cases amounted to 
torture’; legislative amendments that expand the 
definition of torture and lift time-limits for the 
prosecution of cases, pledges to rebuild Shia houses 
of worship destroyed by the regime during the 
crackdown; and the announcement of the construction 
of more than 3000 social housing units. Workers 
dismissed on grounds of political expression have 
been reinstated and charges against 343 individuals 
similarly accused have been dismissed. 
While these gestures have opened up new pathways 
of redress for individual victims of abuse, they also 
highlight one of the major shortcomings dampening 
expectations of (and prospects for) deeper reform. 
This is that the changes rectify specific (or high-
profile) instances of abuse, rather than making deep 
reforms to the structures of political and economic 
power. Recruiting foreign police leaders (ex-assistant 
commissioner of the Metropolitan Police John Yates 
and former chief of the Miami police John Timoney) 
to re-train Bahrain’s security services may play well 
in London and Washington, but it leaves unresolved 
the structural exclusion of large numbers of Bahraini 
citizens from an organisation many perceive as 
exclusionary and deeply-partial.
These measures also do little in the way of empowering 
moderates among the opposition or in government, 
whose leadership is vital to building support for 
any future political reforms. Tentative moves to re-
engage the political opposition lack real meaning 
while many of its leaders remain imprisoned. Perhaps 
most damagingly, the culture of impunity within the 
security services means there is yet to be evidence of 
any high-level accountability. A trial recently began of 
five police officers – none of them Bahrainis – charged 
with involvement in the death in custody of a blogger 
on April 9, 2011, which was attributed (implausibly) at 
the time to ‘complications from sickle cell anaemia.’ 
It stretches credibility to suggest that the scale and 
ferocity of the crackdown may solely be ascribed to 
the actions of (ostensibly renegade) junior personnel. 
Accountability cannot be narrowly limited to those 
who actively carried out abuses. It must include those 
who ordered and orchestrated the crackdown, and 
follow the chain of command upward.
WHAT NEXT FOR BAHRAIN? 
Prospects for building a national consensus around 
reform are further dampened by evidence of growing 
radicalisation of extremist pro-government groups. A 
radical offshoot called the Al-Fateh movement has 
formed out of the pro-government National Unity 
Gathering, which they accused of being too lenient 
toward the protesting opposition. Angry supporters of 
the regime increasingly question why it does not crush 
the revolt, and instead ‘allows’ unrest to simmer and 
damage the Bahraini economy and national image.
As regime support radicalises, the opposition appears 
to be fragmenting, although there always has been a 
divide between the ‘official opposition’ societies and 
the shadowy ‘February 14’ youth movement. Little is 
known about ‘February 14’; a recent article by Ala’a 
Shehabi and Toby Jones for Foreign Policy described 
them as ‘a confederation of loosely organised 
networks…faceless, secretive, and anonymous,’ 
consisting of ‘thousands of supporters [who] have 
abandoned the failed leadership of the country’s 
better established, but listless, political opposition.’ It 
appears they are the vanguard of the protestors who 
confront the regime security services on a daily basis. 
It is unclear if those who subscribe to its ideology are 
necessarily organised through coordinated networks, 
indeed a great deal of their effectiveness derives 
from the sporadic, uncoordinated and unpredictable 
nature of their tactics against security forces. They 
retain a capacity to mobilise and coordinate larger 
demonstrations, as they organised a march of over 
100,000 people on March 9, 2012 in response to a 
remark by the King that the protestors only represented 
a tiny minority of Bahraini citizens. 
Given that Saudi Arabia’s ruling Al-Saud will simply 
not allow a fellow ruling family in the Gulf to fall, 
realpolitik suggests that a political solution will have 
to emerge from within the existing system. American 
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and British support for the Al-Khalifa as a longstanding 
regional ally is a powerful factor insulating the ruling 
family from the participatory pressures of the Arab 
uprisings. Put bluntly, pressures for revolutionary 
change in Bahrain will not be allowed to succeed, 
short of an (unlikely) game-changing development 
either in Saudi Arabia or in the current US posture in 
the Gulf For the Al-Saud, the Al-Khalifa represent the 
weakest link in the chain of authoritarian monarchies 
in the Gulf, while its own Shia communities in its oil-
rich Eastern Province are similarly subjected to political 
marginalisation and sectarian discrimination. Saudi 
policy is therefore predicated on propping up the 
Bahraini regime and ascribing its troubles to external 
(Iranian) manipulation, as this plays well in Washington 
D.C. Thus, escalating tensions with Iran could not have 
come at a better time for opponents of reform, as 
the Americans are not going to abandon an ally (and 
host of the US Fifth Fleet) at this moment in time. 
Yet Bahrain finds itself poised at a profound juncture. 
It can either move toward deep and lasting changes 
to the balance of power between state and society, 
or the regime will have to rely on the use of force 
against an increasingly determined opposition. The 
challenge for the government is overcoming memories 
of the previous cycle of repression (during the 1994-
99 uprising) and the subsequent partial promises of 
reform (2001-10). The longer the old elite remains 
unaccountable at high levels for the abuses of power 
over the past year, the harder it will be to convince 
sceptics of the government’s good faith. Calls to 
violence by opposition and regime hardliners alike 
make any solution more difficult without a decisive 
power-shift towards moderate elements.
These depressing developments portend a bleak future 
for Bahrain. American pressure to halt the banning 
of Al-Wefaq last spring demonstrates that Western 
partners can use their leverage to mitigate the worst of 
the abuses of power. However, the prevailing reaction 
among US and UK policy makers was epitomised by 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s blunt assertion in 
November 2011 that ‘there will be times when not 
all of our interests align. We work to align them, but 
that is just reality.’ Regime change in Tunisia, Egypt, 
and Libya will not be repeated on the placid shores 
of the Gulf.
This has implications for the other Gulf States should 
they experience an upsurge in protest in the future. 
Their commercial and geo-strategic importance means 
the West will neither abandon any of its Gulf partners 
nor make a stand on humanitarian grounds. And 
while this places Western commercial and institutional 
partners in a difficult position, caught between their 
core regional allies and mounting concern at the 
erosion of human rights and political space, the 
consequences for Gulf polities are momentous. 
Officials throughout the region will be observing how 
cracking down so hard has saved the Al-Khalifa, at 
least for now. But their survival has come at a very high 
price economically and politically, and has shattered 
social cohesion in a country polarised as never before. 
With a ruling family determined to swim against the 
tide of the Arab Spring, uninterested in meaningful 
political compromise and reliant on foreign protection 
as the guarantor of regime security, ruling elites will 
be absorbing lessons from the Al-Khalifa’s crushing 
of opposition at the expense of their domestic and 
international credibility.  ■ 
